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LIABILITY REGULATIONS IN EUROPEAN
SUBCONTRACTING: WILL JOINT LIABILITY BE THE
2 1 ST CENTURY EUROPEAN APPROACH?
Matthew R. Amon *
The proliferation of Multinational Enterprises ("MNE") in the
European marketplace has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the
decentralization and transnationalisation of European business enterprises has
ushered in an impressive era of economic growth and stability in the European
Union ("E.U."). 1 MNEs can deliver substantial benefits to European Union
Member States ("Member States") by efficiently allocating labour, capital, and
technology 2 and fostering intense competition between enterprises previously
protected by national boundaries. The actual result of this brave new world of
economic activity has been an "unprecedented rate of economic activity over
the last quarter of a century [that] has placed a major role in raising employment
levels across most economies of the European Union." On the other hand, the
decentralization and transnationalisation of European business enterprises has
generated new regulatory, economic, and social challenges. Today's European
MNEs lack the traditional vertical integration of yesteryear, and instead take a
more horizontal organizational approach, creating complex production and labor
networks.4 Particularly, the practice of subcontracting has experienced a boom
in the European Union over the past few decades. Many MINEs do not just
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank the managing staff
of the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW for this opportunity. I owe a great debt to
Drew Sumner, Michael Blumer and Debra Sapir for keeping me on track and on time. I would also
like to thank Professor Michael Granne for supervising this Note and Herr Thomas Kohl for
inspiring it. Gratitude is also due to my supportive family and my wonderful fianc6, Carolyn
Edythe Avery. Finally, I would like to thank Rhoda Amon, to whom I owe everything.
1 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the Social Responsibility of Subcontracting
Undertakings in Production Chains, at 4, EUR. PARL. REs. 2008/2249(INI)(2008), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&re
ference=PE415.234 [hereinafter Motion].
2 INT'L LABOUR

ORG. [ILO], TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (3d ed. 2001), available at

CONCERNING

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-dcomm/documents/normativeinstrument/kdOO121.pdf.
3 Id.

id.

4

'Id. at 9.
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utilize complex subcontracting chains primarily in the construction sector, "but
also in other economic sectors such as the cleaning industry, transport, tourism
and the shipyard industry, to name only a few." 6 The widespread use of
subcontracting chains has raised important legal questions regarding the "legal
implications of subcontracting for employers and workers, its impact on
employee rights, the increased potential for social dumping and a potential
avoidance of fiscal and social security responsibilities."7 This note examines
the recent proposal by the European Parliament's Committee on Employment
and Social Affairs ("Committee") for new regulations imposing enterprise
liability for European MNEs. The note is divided into four sections. The First
Section will examine the Committee's Motion for a European Parliament
Resolution on the Social Responsibility of Subcontracting Undertakings in
Production Chains ("Motion") by examining its broad concepts, defining key
concepts, and exploring the Motion's recitals individually. The Second Section
will examine enterprise liability laws already in place in eight Member States.
The Second Section will examine each Member States' laws and evaluate their
effect and effectiveness. The Third Section will examine reactions of European
social and business actors to the principal of joint liability. The Fourth Section
is dedicated to conclusions.
I. THE MOTION, KEY CONCEPTS DEFINED, AND THE MOTION'S
RECITALS

A. The Motion's broad principles.
The Committee's Motion is an eleven-page document with sweeping
possibilities for the European business community. Though it mostly reiterates
social and labour policies of previous E.U. resolutions and mandates, including
those calling for penalties against companies that illegally employ third-country
nationals 8 and those calling for increased labour rights awareness among posted
workers, 9 the truly ground breaking recommendation is for the "[European]
Commission to establish a clear-cut Community legal instrument introducing
joint and several liability at the European level." The Motion's authors call
their proposed liability regime, "[a] European 'joint liability' or 'client liability'

6

Id.
Motion, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 6.

Id. at 5.
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system" that is a European solution to European problems. 10 At a minimum, the
Motion calls for enterprise liability for European companies, with regards to
"wages, social security contributions, taxes, and damages in relation to workrelated accidents.""
The Motion lacks a scienter requirement, that is, "[a]
degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission." 12 Consequently, the proposed
liability would not require any degree of complicity or knowledge on the part of
the superior contracting party. The superior contracting party could be held
jointly liable simply through association with the malfeasant subcontracting
party.
According to the Motion's authors, such a liability scheme would be a
great benefit to posted workers across the European Community, would ensure
that all workers, foreign or domestic, receive the agreed industry minimum, and
would provide a further 'debtor' for aggrieved workers and governments alike
that is likely more solvent.13 The joint liability proposal seeks to "ensure that
the main contractors give greater consideration to whether the [subcontractor] is
reliable and whether it intends to act in compliance with" the host nation's
wages, social security, tax, and tort laws. 14 The theory underpinning the
Committee's call for joint and several liability laws is that if the upper tier
company (principal contractor) can be held liable for the malfeasance of its
subcontractors at any tier, the upper tier companies will have a great incentive
to personally "guarantee that all subcontractors assume their corporate
responsibility in respect of employee's rights." 15
The Motion seeks to regulate the increasingly complex business links
between parent companies and their web of suppliers and contractors. 16 The
following scenario is what the Motion might seek to address: Parent Company
is a construction firm that is incorporated in and has its principal place of
business in Germany. It receives a lucrative contract to construct an apartment
complex in the Netherlands. Parent Company manages the project but
subcontracts the work to three principal subcontractors: Finnish Electrical
Subcontractor, Dutch Masonry Subcontractor, and Italian Architectural
Subcontractor. The Finnish Electrical Subcontractor in turn subcontracts work
to a Portuguese second tier subcontractor to install fiber optic cable. The

Id. at 9.
" Id. at 7.
10

12 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373
13
14
15
16

(8th ed. 2004).

Motion, supra note 1, at 9.
id
Id. at 6.

Id. at 4.
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Portuguese second tier subcontractor then hires a British company, incorporated
in Seychelles, to supply laborers from Poland, Lithuania and Russia. If the
British company fails to pay either the agreed minimum wage to its Lithuanian
workers or the appropriate tax payments, and there was a system of enterprise
liability as per the Motion's recommendation, then the Dutch government and
the Lithuanian employee could hold each and every party in this subcontracting
chain liable for the unpaid taxes and wages, respectively.
B. Defining Key Concepts
A contractor is generally any company that "contracts to do work or
provide supplies for another [company]." 17 A general, prime or principal
contractor is "[o]ne who contracts for the completion of an entire project,
including purchasing all materials, hiring and paying subcontractors, and
coordinating all the work."1 8 A subcontractor is, generally: "[o]ne who is
awarded a portion of an existing contract by a contractor." 19 The practice of
subcontracting is sometimes referred to as outsourcing. The process creates a
triangular employment relationship with three principal partners: 1. The client
who orders the work; 2. The principal contractor who in part performs some
work and in part outsources part or all of the work from the client; and 3. The
subcontractor who receives the work from the contractor, and then either
performs that work or in part outsources it to another lower tier of
subcontractor.
Triangular
employment
relationships
are becoming
increasingly vital to today's economy. Outsourcing is now
widely recognized for the competitive advantages it provides,
as reflected in the rapidly growing rates of outsourcing around
the world. Many business functions are outsourced for
various reasons: to streamline processes, remove burdens, cut
costs, etc.
There are numerous identifiable forms of
outsourcing, such as sub-contracting, employee leasing, and
the use of temp agencies and service agencies, as well as
various integrated corporate networks and franchising
agreements. 20

1

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 350 (8th ed. 2004).

18

Id. at 351.

19

Id at 1464.
Yuval Feldman, Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post: Optimizing State Intervention in Exploitive Triangular

20
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According to empirical studies, outsourcing can be divided into two
types:
The first type tends to build up a network of contractual
arrangements, namely service contracts, that concern specific
phases or pieces of production to be done outside the firm's
premises; by contract the second type of outsourcing involves
enterprise contracts with an intermediary agency for the
supply of a certain number of workers to work within that
undertaking.2 1
Joint and several liability is:
liability that may be apportioned either among two or more
parties or to only one or a few select members of the group, at
the adversary's discretion.
Thus, each liable party is
individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying
party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from
nonpaying parties.22
Joint and several liability is a concept often used interchangeably with
enterprise liability and chain liability, albeit incorrectly. Joint and several
liability generally references liability between immediately contracting parties
in one segment of the contracting chain. Whereas chain liability "applies not
only in relation to the contracting party, but also to the whole chain. In this
case, the Inland Revenue may address all parties in the chain for the entire debt
of a subcontractor (emphasis added)."23
It is helpful to think of subcontracting as links in a chain. The client
resides at the top of the chain. The client, either an individual or a business
entity, is the ultimate recipient and beneficiary of a contracted-for work.
Typically, the client contracts with a principal contractor, the next link in the
subcontracting chain, for work to be done. Any further links are merely sub or

Employment Relationships,30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y .J. 751, 752 (2009).
21 Luca Ratti, Agency Work and the Idea of Dual Employership: A Comparative Perspective,
30
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 839 (2009).
22 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004).
23 MUKE HOUWERZUL & SASKIA PETERS, LIABILITY IN SUBCONTRACTING PROCESSES IN THE
EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION SECTOR, EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND
WORKING CONDITIONS 2 (2008), available at

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/94/en/1/ EFO894EN.pdf [hereinafter Eurofound].
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intermediary contractors or temporary work agencies. The various "links" are
bound together in a subcontracting chain. When liability is joint and several, it
is generally limited to two immediately bound links. Where liability is chain,
the aggrieved party can seek redress from any link in the entire chain. This note
will generally use the term joint liability to refer to laws that hold the superior
contracting party at least partially liable for the malfeasance of another party in
the contracting chain, unless the cited legislation specifically calls for chain or
joint and several liability.
C. Examination of the Motion's Recitals
Prior to an in-depth discussion of joint and several liability, a thorough
analysis of the Motion's recitals is in order. The recitals begin with citations to
eighteen articles, resolutions, motions, and court cases that purportedly justify
the call for a motion on the social responsibility of subcontracting undertakings
in production chains. The eighteen citations appear immediately prior to fifteen
paragraphs that provide concise justifications for the twenty seven-point motion.
The following paragraphs analyze those recitals that address the issue of joint
liability in subcontracting chains.
The Motion's recitals cite both the International Labour Office's
Tripartite Declarationof PrinciplesConcerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy ("Tripartite Declaration") and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises ("Guidelines"). 24 Together, these two documents constitute what
the European Parliament labeled, "the two most authoritative internationally
agreed sets of standards for corporate conduct." 25 Both the Tripartite
Declaration and the OECD's Guidelines address concerns posed by the
flourishing of MNEs, and through logical extension, the practice of
subcontracting. Both documents stress that MNEs play an important role in
modem business. "Through international direct investment and other means ...
[MNEs] can bring substantial benefits to home and host countries by
contributing to the more efficient utilization of capital, technology, and
labour." 26 The Guidelines note however "[t]oday's competitive forces are
intense and multinational enterprises face a variety of legal, social, and
regulatory settings. In this context, some enterprises may be tempted to gain an

Motion, supra note 1, at 3.
European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on Corporate Social Responsibility: A New
Partnership, 2007 O.J. (C 301E) 45, 46, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:301E:SOM:EN:HTML [hereinafter C301E].
26 ILO, supra note 2, at 2.
24
25
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unfair competitive advantage." 27 The Tripartite Agreement states that the
challenges posed by MNEs to workers' rights and host governments are best
addressed through laws and policies adopted through cooperation between
2'
governments.2 8 The Guidelines
similarly call for international cooperation. 29
Though neither document proposes joint liability regulations for MNIEs, the
principles espoused in the documents emphasize the need for international
cooperation and regulation of MNEs to better balance the needs of
governments, the rights of workers, and the dynamic nature of MNEs.
Similarly, the Motion's recitals recall Article 39 of the European
Community Treaty, which concerns the movement of workers across the
European Community.30 It prohibits discrimination against workers based on
nationality, and secures their right to seek and accept employment offers in the
various E.C. states. 31 The immediately preceding recital references Article
31(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
("Charter").3 2 The Charter's preamble emphasizes a balance between freedom
of enterprise, the rights of individuals, and the stability of public authorities.33
Article 31, Fairand Just Working Conditions, particularly emphasizes the right
of European workers to "working conditions, which respect his or her health,
safety, and dignity."34 Taken together with the Guidelines and the Tripartite
Agreement, by citing Article 39 of the E.C. Treaty and Article 31(1) of the
Charter, the Committee has not only emphasized the benefits offered by MNIEs,
particularly the free flow of labour between the E.C. states, but also cautioned
that the rights of workers and needs of states must be balanced against those
benefits.
The recital referencing the proposal for a directive of the European
Parliament and the Council providing for sanctions against employers of
illegally staying third-country nationals is particularly applicable to the Motion.
Like the Motion, COM(2007) 249 ("COM 2007") addresses a community-wide
concern by holding principal employers responsible even where the infringing

27 ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERATION & DEV

[OECD], OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES 10 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
28
29

ILO, supranote 2, at 2.
OECD, supranote 27, at 5.

Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 57 [hereinafter C321].
31 Id. at 57, 58
32 Motion, supranote 1, at 3.
30

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 364/01, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 8
[hereinafter C364].
3

34

Id. at 15.
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party is a subcontractor.35 COM 2007 addresses the problem of illegal
immigration by punishing business enterprises that employ and take advantage
of the illegal immigrants. 3 6 This concern for illegally employed third-country
nationals and the business environment in the applicable member state is as also
found in the Motion: "Illegal employment . .. leads to losses in public finances,
can depress wages and working conditions, may distort competition between
businesses and means that undeclared workers will not benefit from health
insurance and pension rights that depend on contributions." 3 7 The proposal
calls for a directive that sanctions employers, not the illegally employed
workers. Furthermore, under Article 9 of the proposal: "To the extent that a
financial penalty cannot be recovered from a subcontractor it should be
recoverable from other contractors in the chain of subcontracting, up to and
including the main contractor."38 Sanctions include fines and exclusions from
public subsidies or contracts.39 The proposal advances the principle of
subsidiarity; that for the directive to be effective, it must be community wide
and uniform.40
In 2007, the European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union published its own proposal providing for sanctions against employers of
illegally staying third-country nationals.
The proposal's new Article 9
concerning subcontracting goes further than the previous proposal and requires
that "Member States shall ensure that the main contractor and any immediate
subcontractor" be liable for sanctions and back payments to workers.41
Furthermore, "[t]he main contractor and any intermediate subcontractor shall
under paragraph 1 be liable jointly and severally, without prejudice to the
provisions of national law concerning the rights of contribution or recourse." 42
Taken together with the Motion, it becomes clear that the European Union is
increasingly considering legislation that uniformly binds the entire Community
in sanctioning principal contractors for the malfeasance of their subcontractors.
It is important to note that there is no scienter requirement in either L80/29 or
the Motion. Consequently, the Principal could be held liable, regardless of

35 Proposalfor a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council Providingfor Sanctions
Against Employers of Illegally Staying Third-CountryNationals,at 10, COM (2007) 249 final (May
16, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail dossier-real.cfm?CL=en&Dosld=195730
[hereinafter COM249].
36 Id. at 2.
37

Id. at 2.

39

Id. at 10.
Council Directive 2002/14, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 6 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2002].

40

Id. at 6.

41

Id at 18.
Id at 18.

38

42
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whether the corporate veil is pierced or whether the principal contractor is at
fault.
The Motion also cites the European Parliament's resolution of 13
March 2007 on corporate social responsibility ("2006/2133"),43 which states
that "increasing social responsibility by business, linked to the principle of
corporate accountability, represents an essential element of the European social
model, Europe's strategy for sustainable development, and for the purposes of
meeting the social challenges of economic globalization." 44 Furthermore,
2006/2133 provides that "companies should not be considered a substitute for
public authorities when these fail to exercise control over compliance with
social . . . standards." 45 The motion goes on to state that in the transnational
context, European companies should be held responsible for the activities of
their subcontractors.46
In addition, the Motion cites the European Community's Green Paper,
Modernising labor law to meet the challenges of the 21st century ("Green
Paper"), which purports to launch a debate concerning how E.U. labour law can
balance modern business trends and organization with the Lisbon Strategy's
objective of achieving sustainable growth.47 According to the Green Paper,
European labour markets are challenged to combine "greater flexibility with the
need to maximize [job] security for all. The drive for flexibility in the labour
market has given rise to increasingly diverse contractual forms of employment,
which can differ significantly from the standard contractual model in terms of
the degree of employment." 48 Like the OECD's Guidelines, the Green Paper
attributes technological progress, globalization and a changing economy as
factors driving the changes to the traditional employment model. 4 9 These
factors push European businesses to develop a wide variety of employment
contracts.5 0
"Non-standard as well as flexible standard contractual
arrangements have enabled businesses to respond swiftly to changing consumer
trends, evolving technologies and new opportunities for attracting and retaining
a more diverse workforce through better job matching between supply and
demand.",5
However, the Green Paper notes that the new contractual
43 Motion, supranote 1, at 3.
44

C301E, supranote 25, at 48.

45

Id. at 48.

46

Id. at 51.

47 Commission Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st

Century, at 3, COM (2006) final 708 (Nov. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Green Paper].
48 id

id

49

so Id
1Id. at 7.
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arrangements also push European businesses to avoid employment protection
rules, social security contributions, industry specific wage minimums, etc.52
This is particularly true in extended chains of subcontracting. 53 In response,
"[s]everal Member States have sought to address such problems by making
principal contractors responsible for the obligations of their subcontractors
under a system of joint and several liability. Such a system encourages
principal contractors to monitor compliance with employment legislation on the
part of their commercial partners." 54 In response to Question 9 concerning
three-way employment relationships and the question of joint and several
liability, the Communication Outcome of the public consultation on the
Commission's Green Paper "Modernisinglabour law to meet the challenges of
the 21st century," the European Parliament
highlighted the need to regulate joint and several liability for
principal undertakings to deal with abuses in subcontracting
and outsourcing in the interests of ensuring a level playing
field for companies in a transparent and competitive market.
The response notes that Member States were split on the question of subsidiary
liability; some supporting new liability rules and other expressing satisfaction
with existing laws.56
Finally, the Motion cites the case of Wolff & Muller GmbH & Co. KG
v. Jose Filipe Pereira Felix, referred by the German courts to the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ"), which decided the case in October 2004."' The Court
held, in part, that national laws providing that a subcontractor is a guarantor for
the minimum remuneration of their subcontractors' employees is not, per se,
violative of Directive 96/71 (concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services). According to the Court:
Article 5 of Directive 96/71 'does not preclude a national
system whereby, when subcontracting the conduct of building
work to an undertaking established in another Member State,
a building contractor in another Member State concerned

52

id

Id. at 13.
54 id
53

Id. at 8.
Id at 8.
" Case C-60/03, Wolff & Muller Gmb H. v. Felix, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9553 [hereinafter Wolff].
58 -id
1

56
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becomes liable, in the same way as a guarantor who has
waived the defence of prior recourse, for the obligation on
that undertaking or that undertaking's subcontractors to pay
the minimum wage to a worker employed by the latter or to
pay contributions to a joint scheme for parties to a collective
agreement where the minimum wage means the sum payable
to the worker after deduction of tax, social security
contributions, payments towards the promotion of
employment or other such social insurance payments (net
pay), even if the safeguarding of workers' pay is not the
primary objective of the national legislation concerned or is
merely a subsidiary objective.'5 9
Mr. Pereira Felix was a citizen of Portugal who worked for a Portuguese
subcontractor as a bricklayer at a building cite in Berlin, Germany.60 The
Portuguese subcontractor worked for Wolff & Muller GmbH ("Wolff &
61
Muller"), a German company.
Mr. Felix brought suit against both his
Portuguese employer and Wolf & Muller to recover disputed wages from them
jointly and severally.62 Mr. Felix claimed that Wolff & Muller was jointly and
severally liable for the DEM 4,019.23 in unpaid remuneration because Wolff &
Muller was a guarantor of his wages under Paragraph 1(a) of the ArbeitnehmerEntsendegesetz (law on the posting of workers or "AEntG"). Under the AEntG:
[a]n undertaking which appoints another undertaking to
provide building services within the meaning of Paragraph
211(1) of the third book of the Sozialgesetzbuch [("SGB III")]
is liable, in the same was a guarantor who has waived the
defense of prior recourse, for the obligations of that
undertaking, of any subcontractor... concerning payment of
the minimum wage.63
Wolff & Muller countered that it was not liable under the AEntG in part
because Paragraph 1(a) violates Article 49 of the E.C. Treaty on the freedom of
movement of services.64 The ECJ agreed with the petitions filed by the
German, Austrian, and French governments and the European Commission that

60
61
62
63
64

id.
Id.
id
id.
id
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"liability as a guarantor certainly provides workers with a genuine benefit that
contributes to their protection. Workers are given another party, in addition to
their employer, against whom they can pursue their claims for net wages under
national legislation." 65
The legal underpinning of the decision is as follows: Under Article 5 of
Directive 96/71, the E.U. required that Germany adopt national legislation
ensuring that there were adequate protections for posted workers to seek
redress, as in the case of unremunerated pay.66 Article 5 grants Germany a wide
berth in fashioning its own national legislation for an aggrieved posted worker
to seek redress.67 Paragraph 1(a) AEntG does not fall outside that wide scope.68
Noticeably absent from the Wolff & Muller decision on the chain
liability of national legislation in the E.U. Member States is a scienter
requirement. That is, neither the courts nor the legislatures place a high
importance on the concept of complicity on the part of the client or principal
contractor as an element of the offense. Thus, the principal contractors are held
to a strict liability. They are responsible to the some degree for the malfeasant
acts of the subcontractors regardless of whether the corporate veil was pierced.
The situation is reminiscent of the holding in Union Carbide v. Union of
India,69 often referred to as the Bhopal Case. In the Bhopal Case, the
government of India, representing thousands of Indian national plaintiffs,
brought suit against Union Carbide Corporation ("UCC"), an American
corporation, in Bhopal District Court in India under a theory of multinational
enterprise liability. 70 The Indian courts found against UCC, despite a dearth of
evidence that either UCC exercised any considerable control over the pesticide
factory at dispute or that UCC had pierced the corporate veil.71 Despite
evidence to the contrary, the courts found that UCC had in fact kept itself at
arms length from its subsidiary Union Carbide India, Ltg. However, that did
not protect UCC from liability.72 The Bhopal Case is worth consideration in the
context of the Motion, because in the Bhopal Case, liability was assigned
without a strong scienter requirement. In both situations, liability for the
malfeasance of one company is imposed on an otherwise distinct legal entity,

Id.
id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 273 [hereinafter
Union Carbide].
70 DETLEV F. VOGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 194-95 (Foundation
Press 4th
ed. 2008).
71 Id. at 196.
65
66

72

d
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through no fault of its own.
In the Motion's recitals, the Committee makes a strong argument for
joint liability regulations as a European response to abuses in subcontracting.
Taken together, the recitals demonstrate that precedent exists for joint liability
regulations and that some E.U. Member States already have such regulations, a
lack of uniformity across the E.U. impedes their ability to function succinctly.
It now becomes appropriate to isolate the studies conducted by the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, cited
prominently in the Motion's recitals.
II. JOINT LIABILITY LAWS IN EIGHT MEMBER STATES

A. The Eurofound Report
The Motion prominently cites a series of reports by the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
("Eurofound").73
Eurofound's main report, Liability in subcontracting
processes in the European construction sector addresses the legal implications
of subcontracting in Europe, and surveys various Member States' liability
laws.74 Specifically, Eurofound focuses on eight Member States' laws: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 5 The
Eurofound reports offer the most comprehensive and recent survey of E.U.
Member State liability laws, and its findings will constitute the bulk of section
two of this note.
According to the Eurofound report, there has been a boom in
subcontracting practices in Europe over the past twenty-five years.76 Though
the report cites three different subcontracting trends, at the core of each is a
principal organization utilizing smaller businesses to perform the actual
contracted for work.
Over time, the chains linking subcontractors and other
workers to their principal employers have become increasingly long and
complicated. 78 "The growing use of subcontracting for labour intensive
segments of the execution of construction projects does not necessarily lead to a
deterioration of the working conditions, but it certainly has created a decrease

73 Motion, supra note 1, at 4.
74 EUROFOUND, supranote 23, at 1.
7
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of the direct social responsibility of the principal contractor (emphasis
added)." 79 Abuses naturally sprung from this decreased direct responsibility.
The Eurofound report cites an example from the Union of Construction, Allied
Trades and Technicians ("UCATT") in the United Kingdom ("UK"), where a
principal contractor paid a dozen Lithuanian subcontractors below minimum
wages, failed to pay overtime and charged the workers for their rent, tools and
utilities.so "The steadily evolving integration of the Member States' economies
in the internal market of capital, goods, services, and persons - together with the
recent EU enlargements - have also led to the greater movement of workers
across countries."" The lower end of subcontracting chains tends to be filled
with foreign companies posting foreign workers who may be particularly
vulnerable to abuse.8 2 The Eurofound report cites for example, the case of ZRE
Katowicz Ireland Construction Ltd., which had been contracted by a German:
enterprise to carry out scaffolding work on a large contract,
which the German company had with the Irish power plant
operator, the Electricity Supply Board ... for the £380 million
refurbishment of its plant. When the German company
discovered that ZRE had not been complying with the Irish
employment law, it terminated its contract, forcing ZRE to
dismiss 200 of it[s] Polish employees.83
It is in this context that the European Union and particularly the
European Parliament took up the question of joint and several liability for
principal contractors, as an effective compliance tool to protect Member State
and Community law.84
Joint liability laws in subcontracting chains date back to the 1960s and
1970s for Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and France. Spain, Austria
and Germany followed suit in the 1980s and 1990s. 86 "The regulations were
introduced in order to prevent the abuse of employee's rights and the evasion of
rules, as well as to combat undeclared work and illegal unfair business
competition. 7 Some Member States (Austria, France and Italy) developed

79
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legislation to prevent cross-border dumping in the construction sector, while the
other Member States developed laws to protect at least two of the following:
social security contributions, taxes on wages, and minimum wages.
"Sanctions for parties who do not abide the liability rules fall under three main
categories across the eight Member States: back-payment obligations, fines,
and/or alternative additional penalties." 8 9 Additionally, Eurofound cites various
preventative measures that are in place in all Member States except Belgium.
These measures include requirements for the principal company to check the
reliability of subcontractors and various measures to "guarantee the payment of
wages, social security contributions, and wage tax." 90 The following sections
will examine the existing laws in eight E.U. Member States, including the laws'
historical context, their breadth and scope, and their effectiveness.
B. AUSTRIA
Generally, under Austrian law, "the principal contractor to a job
maintains an element of responsibility for the wages of employees in a
subcontracting chain." 91 Austria first introduced legislation concerning the
liability of principal contractors for the malfeasance of subcontractors in the
1990s. 92 The Austrian parliament considered the legislation in light of problems
suffered by their northern neighbor, Germany. 93 In post-unification Germany,
"social dumping in the construction sector was becoming a major problem with
regard to foreign companies and workers." 94 Like Germany, Austria is a high
wage country surrounded by low wage countries like the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia. 95 Consequently, "it is very attractive for [non
Austrian] companies to operate in Austria using their own workers who receive
wages at the level of their country of origin." 96 The Austrian government and
various Austrian labor groups argued that this would depress wages and

" Id. at 2.
89 Id.
90 I1d.

91 Walter Gagawczuk, Liability in SubcontractingProcesses in the European Construction Sector:
Austria, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS

1 (2008), available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/871/en/l/efl)887len.pdf
[hereinafter EurofoundAustria].
92 id
93 id
94 Id. at 2.
95 id
96 Id
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generally disrupt the labor market in Austria. 97 Prior to the introduction of
legislation in 1995, various Austrian ministries and their various labor and
business social partners discussed two key issues:
1.

Whether Austrian Associations (Verbandsklage) could
seek judicial remedies in collective suits; and

2.

Whether any legislation should sanction employers that
pay less than the industry minimum wage. 98

In 1995, the Austrian parliament introduced the Antimissbrauchgesetz
("Anti-Abuse Act"), which contained §7(2)(2) - ArbeitsvertragsrechtAnpassungsgesetz (Employment Contract Law Amendment Act or
"AVRAG"). 99 The provision was later amended with §§7a(2) and 7c, and came
into force in 1999.100 According to Eurofound, "[t]he main objective of the
liability provisions - the old Article 7 AVRAG and the new articles 7a(2) and
7c AVRAG is to combat non-payment and abuse of employees in the context of
cross-border subcontracting practices and thus avoiding potential cases of social
dumping and illegal business competition."101 Section 7a(2) applies exclusively
to cross-border posted workers where the principal contractor's corporate seat is
outside the European Union.102 Section 7c AVRAG applies to principal
contractors whose principal corporate seats are located within the E.U.103 Thus
every business is within the AVRAG's reach. Section 7c(2) is similarly
applicable in public procurement contracts where the principal contractor
subcontracts at least part of the work to a subcontractor.104 Under the
Bundesvergabegesetz (Federal Public Procurement law or "BVergG"), the
principal contractor can subcontract the work where the subcontractors are
capable, competent and have a: "certain reliability."os Thus, the principal
contractor is responsible for ascertaining the subcontractor's credentials, which
can be readily accomplished by referencing a register of subcontractors called

97

d

98 Id.
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the AuftragnehmerkatasterOesterreich ("ANKO"). 10 6
Overall, most interested parties consider Austria's liability legislation
for subcontractors to be ineffective.10 7 The Eurofound report cites three
principal reasons for this opinion:
Enforcement of the few known rules is left solely to the
employee and their legal representative;
The provisions do not apply in the case of bankruptcy of the
subcontractor;
As liability is restricted to the highest level of the chain, the
employee has to prove that the principal contractor was aware
of an unreliable subcontractor some levels further down the
chain, which is almost an impossible task. At best, the rules
have a rather modest preventive impact on the behavior of the
principal contractor when choosing subcontractor(s).108
First, the provisions are private law, so no public ministries like the
Arbeitsinspektorat ("Labour Inspectorate") are charged with enforcing the
legislation. 109 Consequently, private parties, such as an aggrieved employee or
posted worker (and perhaps his advocate from a group like the
OesterreichischerGewerkschaftsbund "Austrian Trade Union Federation"), the
employer(s),
(sometimes
through
their representatives
like the
Wirtschaftskammer Oesterreich "Austrian Federal Economic Chamber"), and
the courts are involved. 10
Furthermore, the AVRAG contains several loopholes through which
principal contractors can avoid liability. "[§7c AVRAG] states in its fifth
paragraph that the liability is not applicable if the subcontractor is insolvent ...
Furthermore, according to the dominant interpretation, the liability arrangement
is restricted to the highest level of the [subcontracting] chain."" Lastly, even
where an employee can legitimately bring suit for lost wages, overtime, etc,, he
would not seek it from the subcontracting chain, but rather from the Austrian

106 Id. at
107

7.
Id. at 14.

108 Id.
109
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Insolvenzausfallgeldfonds - a fund for the protection of employees should their
employer go bankrupt. 112 Arguably, the most effective Austrian legislation is
§7a(2) AVRAG, which commands joint and several liability without
reservation.11 However, §7a(2) AVRAG applies only to principal contractors
having a principal place of business outside of the E.U. 114 Despite the strict
joint and several liability restrictions, there are many practical barriers for a
foreign worker to actually bring suit against the subcontracting chain, including
the lack of legal representation, language barriers, and a general fear of losing
future employment.
C. BELGIUM
"Belgium does not have a framework on liability in subcontracting
processes. Liability is established mainly in the constructor sector. . . pursuant
to Article I of the Royal Decree of 27 December 2007. . . The liability covers
taxes on wages, social security contributions and social fund payments."1 1 5
Belgium's liability laws on subcontracting practices date back to the 1970s.
They were largely in reaction to the public alarm over the so-called
gangmasters, and the aberrant contractors who employed, sometimes, thousands
of workers but failed to pay social security contributions or taxes on wages. 116
The legislation, then as now, principally targeted the construction sector, where
most of the infractions took place. 11 7 In response to these labor abuses, the
Federale Overheidsdienst Financien ("Federal Public Service Finance")
proposed banning the practice of subcontracting entirely.1 1 8
The liability on foreign and domestic contractors and subcontractors
alike was joint and several. 119 Furthermore, Belgian law required the principal
contractor to notify the relevant ministries that it was using subcontractors. 120
All contractors were strongly urged to register with the appropriate provincial

112

id

113

id

114

id

Jan Buelens, Liability in Subcontracting Processes in the European Construction Sector:
Belgium, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING
CONDITIONS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/872/en/1/efD8872en.pdf.
116 Id. at 1-2.
117Id.
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registration concern.121 Under the Royal Decree of 27 December 2007,
contractors could register if they met defined registration requirements, such as
a lack of bankruptcies, a demonstration of a strong financial situation, and the
absence of previous violations of social, tax and wage obligations.122
Contractors that successfully registered enjoyed certain tax and subsidy
benefits. Furthermore,
the client and principal contractor were jointly liable for the
debts of the contracting part. . . if the contracting party was
not registered. In case of non-registration, the contracting
party had to make certain deductions and pay them into the
social and tax administration. After these deductions had
been made, the client and principal contractor remained liable
only for the outstanding sum of money. 123
The European Court of Justice ushered in the current liability laws
when it rendered its decision on November 9, 2006 in the matter of Commission
v. Belgium. 124 "The ECJ ruled that the Belgian system regarding tax on wages
violated the freedom to provide cross-border services within the European
Union ... as stipulated in articles 49 and 50 of the EC Treaty, because the
obligatory nature of the registration system could have a deterrent effect on
foreign companies."1 25 Consequently, Belgium passed new legislation ("Article
30bis Law 27 June 1969, as amended by the Law of 27 April 2007; Article 400
and those that followed of the Direct Income Code") 126 that went into effect in
2008, that severed the link between registration and liability. Furthermore, the
liability is no longer chain, but rather contractual. 127 "If a contracting party fails
to meet their [social security, tax, and social fund] obligations, the
administration first has to invoke the liability on the other party. The
administration can address the next level in the chain only if this party also fails
to meet its obligations." 128 The principal contractor must only withhold a
percentage of payments to the subcontractors if the latter has outstanding social
or tax debts. 129 Principal contractors may be subject to a small fine if they fail
121
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Id. at 3; Commission v. Belgium, 2006 O.J. (C 433) 4.
id
Id. at 3.
id
Id. at 12.
id

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

249

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

19

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 10
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

to make these withholdings where appropriate, and may also be liable to a
surcharge equal to the withholding amount.13 0
According to Eurofound, Belgians are conflicted on the effectiveness
of their pre and post 2006 EJC ruling liability legislation.131 The social actors
interviewed in the report generally agreed that the pre-EJC ruling legislation
effectively reduced fraud by giving all contracting parties a strong incentive to
register, and thus met good business practice standards. 13 2 However, the social
actors also expressed frustration with the complicated nature of the old (and
new) regulations.133 Eurofound states that though the new liability regulations
are too recent to adequately evaluate, many social actors have expressed doubts
on feasible enforcement because there is no longer an incentivizing link
between registration and liability. Furthermore, "the ministry has experienced
problems acting against foreign companies, which are often used as buffers
between the Belgian client or principal contractor and the Belgian
subcontractor." 13 4 Though time will tell the effectiveness of the new liability
rules, the early results indicate that Belgium considered its older liability regime
to be more effective.
D. FINLAND
Finnish liability laws are primarily applicable to its construction
industry.1 3 5 The rules are found in both Finland's Penal Code and Collective
Labour Agreements ("CLA"). 13 6 The rules cover wage tax and social security
contributions, "but are essentially informative and meant to promote a sound
economy but do not include a real monetary liability of the principal contractor
for the obligations of the subcontractors." 3 7 Finnish liability laws are relatively
recent. The latest and most applicable legislation came into force in 2007 (Law
2006/1233 or "Liability Act").
The Liability Act principally applies to building services across the

Id. at 6.
Id at 8.
132 Id. at
8-9.
133 Id. at 9.
134 id.
135 Jari Hellsten, Liability in Subcontracting Processes in the European
Construction Sector:
Finland, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LivING AND WORKING
CONDITIONS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/873/en/1/ef)8873en.pdf.
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contractual chain, from builders to repairmen to developers.138 However,
liability is not chain. Instead, the Liability Act imposes "liability throughout the
chain but only in relation to the contracting partner."13 9 Thus, a contractor
would only be liable for the most immediate subcontractor's party. In Finland:
A building project is legally seen as simply a pyramid of
independent commercial service contractors, in which each
contracting party has its own responsibilities. It is not
considered an interrelated chain in which all parties have a
share in the same project and which therefore justifies more
responsibilities such as chain liability for the client and/or
principal contractor. 140
This liability is nationwide and applicable to foreign subcontractors. 141
The principal requirement of the Liability Act is that the main contractor
investigates and assesses the reliability of their subcontractor. 142 Furthermore,
the Liability Act imposes a negligence fee on the principal contractor when it
fails to perform the necessary background checks on the subcontractor pursuant
to Section 5 of the Liability Act. 143 The Liability Act does not impose backpayment obligations on the principal contractor. 144
The CLEs date back to the 1970s, much further than the Liability
Act. 145 The CLEs are private agreements between contracting parties. They are
essentially moral obligations that the principal contractor will be a guarantor of
the subcontractor's employees' wages. 146 Consequently, the obligation is not
sanctioned, and depends entirely on internal discipline and self-regulation. 147
"The liability is not applicable to non-organised principal contractors . . . [and]

actions against non-organised principal contractors seldom occur."1 48
Finally, a provision in the Finnish Penal Code can be interpreted as
imposing chain liability in subcontracting operations. Under Chapter 10 §2(1)
of the Penal Code, "anyone benefitting from a criminal offense, such as work
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discrimination or discrimination on the grounds of national origin for
profiteering purposes, both due to illegally low wages, may become subject to
forfeiture." 1 4 9 A general amendment was added to the penal code in 2001,
"making it now possible to direct the confiscation against a principal contractor
or client benefitting from the payment of illegally low wages." 5 0
Eurofound concluded that the liability provisions currently in place in
Finland are generally accepted by the relevant social actors and play a limited
preventative role in combating fraud in subcontracting. 5 1 Though various
labour and trade union organizations would prefer more stringent chain liability
provisions,152 Eurofound notes that profound opposition to such measures from
the Finnish business community is likely to prevent its implementation in the
near future.153 Furthermore, since the Liability Act is very recent, a full
evaluation of its effectiveness is not currently possible. 154 Thus, the Finnish
position is likely to be a wait and see one with regards to E.U. legislation.
E. FRANCE
French liability in subcontracting chain laws date back to the 1970s
and are some of the most stringent in Europe.1 55 In France, several kinds of
liability arrangements exist for principal contractors and clients in the
subcontracting chain for wages, social security contributions and taxes on
wages.156 The first French law regarding joint liability is still in force today,
through amended.15 7 Law No. 75-1334 of 31 December 1975 ("1975 Law") on
joint liability primarily protects subcontractors from defaulting general
contractors.1 5 8 Law No. 90-613 of 12 July 1990, JORF No. 16 of 14 July 1990
("1990 Law") - "on joint liability between an entrepreneur and their
subcontractor for the payment of salaries, holidays, and social security
contributions for the benefit of the subcontractors" - workers must be seen in the
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152 Id. at 10-11.
153 Id. at 12.
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155 Barbara Palli, Liability in Subcontracting Processes in the European
Construction Sector:
France, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS
1 (2008), available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/874/en/1/ef08874en.pdf.
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context of bogus subcontracting." 5 9 Law No. 91-1383 of 31 December 1991,
JO No. 1 of 1 January 1992 ("1992 Law") mandates joint liability where the
business fails to make payments to workers or social security bodies. 160 The
rationale of these joint liability provisions is that the ultimate beneficiary of an
illegal work/service should bear the financial consequences of the illegality."1 6 1
The 1992 law is supposed to encourage clients and contractors to choose lawabiding subcontractors, and then act as guarantors to the state and other parties
in the subcontracting chain if the subcontractors are, in fact, illegal. 162 Finally,
Law No. 2005-882 of 2 August 2005 incorporated in Article L 1262-4 and
Article 1262-5 of the Labour Code is implementing legislation for E.U.
Directive 96/71, previously discussed in this Note's Belgium section.163
Together, these are the principal provisions that delegate chain liability on
subcontracting.
The 1975 Law provides "national and/or foreign subcontractors with a
direct action against the order provider for the payment of work and services
provided where the main contractor proves to be insolvent."1 64 Under the 1975
Law, subcontractors are protected by either of two means: first, through a
private agreement where the principal contractor secures an arrangement with
the subcontractors for guaranteeing payment, which can take several forms
under the French Civil Code 165 Second, under Article 12 of the 1975 Law, the
subcontractor can initiate a direct action against the client where the client
accepted the subcontractor's contract to work, the client accepted the private
contractual arrangement between the principal and the subcontractor, and the
principal contractor failed to honor that arrangement.166 Clients then have a
direct incentive to have direct knowledge of the subcontractors on the project
and the agreements arranged between the contracting parties. Likewise, the
principal contractors "must secure acceptance of each subcontractor by the
client - either when the subcontracting agreement is signed or later on during
the whole duration of the contract. The principal contractor must also secure an
agreement regarding the conditions of payment. At the same time, principal
contractors are legally bound to pass on to the client all subcontracting
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agreements whenever they are so required." 16 7 Under French law, the aggrieved
subcontractor can bring suit to recover the unpaid cost of services. 168 The
principal contractor must inform and obtain the same consent from the client in
public procurement as well. 169 Non-compliance could cost the contractor a twoyear prison sentence or an E18,000 fine. 170 Thus, under the 1975 Law, both the
client and the principal contractor are jointly liable when either fails to meet
their obligations to the subcontractor. The client and the principal contractor
both act as guarantors of compliance.
The 1990 Act similarly applies to every French principal contractor
that utilizes foreign or domestic subcontractors.17 1 The 1990 Act purports to
protect the subcontractor's employees in the event that the employing
subcontractor fails to remunerate the worker or otherwise violates legal or
collective agreement provisions.172 The theory behind the 1990 Act is that the
contractor, being the beneficiary of the subcontractor's efforts, must then
subsequently act as guarantor of the defunct subcontractor's social security and
worker's salaries obligations. 173 The 1990 Law lacks a specific scienter
requirement, and is so applicable regardless of any fault or contractual
obligations to the contrary. 174 Violations by the subcontractor are subject to a
fine of C30,000 and/or two years' imprisonment, and the principal contractor
may also be subjected to a C12,000 fine or a one-year prison sentence.175
Furthermore, where the subcontractor defaults on any of its obligations to its
workers, regardless of whether any party in the contracting chain is at fault, the
aggrieved workers, either individually or collectively through a representative
trade union, can bring a direct legal action against the principal contractor. 176
France's liability laws extend further than just the traditional clientcontractor-subcontractor model to include the utilization of temporary work
agencies. Under the French Labour Code, the user company, whether it is the
client, contractor, or subcontractor, is ultimately responsible for the agency
worker's salaries and social security contributions.1 7 7 Though the user company
may demand a certificate of good standing from the temporary work agency,
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

id
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 7.
id
id
id.
Id.
Id.
Id

254

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol9/iss1/10

24

Amon: Liability Regulations in European Subcontracting: Will Joint Liab
LIABILITY REGULATIONS INEUROPEAN SUBCONTRACTING
"the law does not provide for a specific sanction should the agency fail to
comply with the requirement."178
In addition, in 1992, joint liability in the context of illegal or
undeclared work was introduced in French law by an Act of
Parliament entitled 'Legislationfor the reinforcement of the
battle againstundeclaredwork.' This Act was adopted on the
basis of a report highlighting the inadequacy of previous
provisions in combating undeclared work in the context of
subcontracting chains. 179
In the context of illegal work, the client can be held jointly and
severally liable with either the principal contractor or the subcontractor for
failure to fully remunerate workers or pay the appropriate taxes or social
security obligations.
Thus, the client or the principal contractor acts as a
guarantor of the malfeasant contractor's wage and social obligations.
Article L.8222-1 of the Labour Code ...

now provides that

every client. . . is under a legal obligation to: verify that the
other party has accomplished all declaration formalities
required in order to provide services as an independent
contractor or to employ others on the conclusion of a contract
for services or a subcontracting agreement worth a minimum
of £3,000 and then periodically, every six months, until the
end of the contract.' 8 '
Furthermore, under Article 8.222-2, clients and principal contractors
found guilty of benefitting from illegal work face penalties of three years
imprisonment, a fine of £45,000, bans of public procurement, public
humiliation, etc. 182
The Eurofound study concluded that there were too few adjudicated
cases in French jurisprudence to adequately examine the effectiveness of
France's liability laws. 183 Eurofound cites widespread social acceptance of
black market economic activity as a strong reason why relatively few aggrieved
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parties took advantage of the strong provisions. 18 4 Furthermore, as in all the
other national studies, practical considerations such as the language barrier and
their limited stay prevent abused foreign workers from exercising their rights
under French law.1"' Some business groups decry the regulations as overly
burdensome for employers while ignoring the real offenders. 186 Trade union
groups have typically come out in favor of the rules, and have even advocated
for outright bans on subcontracting. 187 The overall legislative trend in France is
towards more liability regulations and strict reporting requirements from posted
workers.'
Consequently, it seems likely that France will be supportive of an
E.U. initiative for making joint and several liability in subcontracting.
F. GERMANY
Germany's liability laws date back to the early 2000s, and principally
apply to the German construction sector.189
Articles 48 et seq. [Einkommensteuergesetz, Income Tax Act
or "EtsG"] were introduced in 2001 against the background of
illegal activity in the construction industry. Due to removal of
the internal frontiers of the European Union . . . and the

increasing permeability of its external
opportunity for illegal activity had grown. 190

frontiers,

the

Article 48 EStG established joint liability for building services
recipients for taxes owed to the Inland Revenue office. 191 These taxes include
workers' wages, income tax and corporation income tax.192 The liability is not
true chain liability. Rather, it is narrower, and binds only two vertically tied
parties to each other. 193 Furthermore, the higher-ranking contracting party
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indemnifies itself through obtaining exemption certificates stating that the
company is in compliance with the law. 194 The withholding amount is
relatively small, at just 15% of the total monetary consideration between the
contracting parties. 195 "If an exemption certificate has been submitted, the
principal contractor is only liable if it could not trust in the legitimacy of the
exemption certificate . . . If the principal contractor withholds tax and transfers

it to the Inland Revenue office, preventative measures are not necessary."1 96
Germany adopted Article 28 of the Viertes Bush des
Sozialgesetzbuches (Fourth Book of the Social Security Code or "Article 28") in
2002 "to combat illegal employment and illicit work. By establishing a liability
of the principal contractor for the obligations of subcontractors concerning the
payment of contributions, [Article 28] ensures that the principal contractor takes
care that subcontractors fulfil their obligations regarding payments." 197 Article
28 applies to the provision of building services worth £500,000 or more.198
Either the principal contractor or another company along the subcontracting
chain that hired out another company acts like a directly enforceable guarantor
under Article 28.199 That is, the relevant government body health insurer acts
like a creditor with the right to collect from any party in the subcontracting
chain, including the principal contractor, the client or any intermediary
subcontractors.200 However, before the liability can be invoked, the collecting
government agency must first remind the party that its payment is due. The
warning period must first expire before further action can be taken. 20 1 Even
then, the principal contractor has a chance to exonerate itself 202
Article 1a of the Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz(Posted Workers Act or
"AentG") "establishes a liability of the principal contractor of works and
services for the obligations of the client, intermediary contractor and temporary
work agency (hirer) concerning payment of minimum wages to workers and
leave fund contributions to the Leave and Wage Equalisation Fund of the
Building Industry (Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft,
ULAK)."203 Germany introduced Article la in 1999, and has substantially
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amended it over the past 10 years. The article was introduced in response to the
pervading corruption existing in the German construction sector in the aftermath
of German reunification and E.U. integration.20 Germany correctly concluded,
"principal contractors might have a tendency to opt for subcontractors who keep
their costs down by not paying minimum wages and leave fund contributions
under the AentG." 205 Earlier forms of the AentG merely imposed a fine, which
the German government found inadequate to enforce the law in light of
numerous complaints from foreign governments and their embassies that had to
repatriate posted workers in Germany, who were presumably abandoned in
Germany by their malfeasant subcontracting employer.206 Under Article la, the
principal contractor or the intermediate subcontractor that hired the services of
another contracting company is liable as a guarantor for the unpaid wages of the
subcontracting company's employees. 207 The employing company may also be
liable for unpaid contributions to the ULAK.208 Article la gives unremunerated
employees the right to seek redress in Germany labour courts from the principal
contractor or any other contracting party above its employer in the vertical
contracting chain. 20 9 Article la is the subject of the controversial Wolff &
Mueller case discussed above. The law was substantially amended in 2007, and
its scope was expanded to cover 'work and services' instead of building services
exclusively. 210 From the legislative record, it appears that the Germany
Bundestag will consider expansions to postal services and other economic
sectors in the years to come.211
According to the Eurofound report on Germany, German business,
social and governmental actors have mixed views on the existing liability
laws.212 The report cites widespread criticism of Article 28, which was both
overly bureaucratic and expensive and questionably effective.213 Between 2002
and 2004, the German government imposed only eight fines under the law; one
of which was enforced, totaling C2,000.214 At the same time, it is estimated that
Article 28 costs Germany construction companies more than CI million a year
in compliance costs. Likewise, Article 48's withholding tax procedure has an
204
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uncertain claim to success. About 95% of construction business endeavors
apply for an exemption to the 15% consideration withholding for the Inland
Revenue Office.215 However, Article la AentG is considered an effective law
in Germany, which many credit to its simple liability rules and lack of scienter
requirement. 216
If an element of negligence or fault was included in Article la
AentG, the mostly justifiable claims of workers and of the
joint institution of the social partners could not succeed.
Since the liability of the principal contractor regardless of
fault has been implemented, large companies and their
organizations are much more interested in information
regarding the provisions of the AentG and the possibilities of
urging their subcontractors to observe this law.217
G. ITALY
The breadth and depth of liability laws in Italy is considerable. Italian
laws impose chain liability on the client, principal contractor and intermediary
subcontractors for wage tax, social security contributions, social fund payments,
wage and holiday payments, and even health and safety obligations. 2 18 The
Italian justification for these extensive liability regulations is the same as in the
other eight Member States: to hold the most solvent parties as guarantors of
workers' rights and pay,219 to protect revenue streams to the relevant
government authorities 220 and to ensure a high level of transparency in Italian
markets. 22 1 The most sweeping and relevant Italian legislation is also recent,
222
having been implemented in the past ten years.
In 2003, the Italian parliament passed Section 29 Subsection 2 of
Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 ("LD 276"), concerning the passive joint and

215
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Id. at 17.
217 id
218 Rosario Salonia & Mario Emanuele, Liability in Subcontracting Processes
in the European
Construction Sector: Italy, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND
WORKING CONDITIONS 1 (2008), available at
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several liability of both the client and the principal contractor. 223 Section 29
contains this sweeping legislation:
[I]n the case of the contracting of works or services, the client
or employer is jointly and severally obliged, together with the
(principal) contractor and with each and every subcontractor,
to pay the wages and social security contributions of the
workers within two years of the date of termination of the
contract.224
LD 276 also incorporates other workers' rights, like paid holidays,
have an international element to it.
In case of cross-border contracting, foreign inland revenue
and social security authorities will be able to demand payment
by an Italian client or contractor, bound by the constraint of
joint and several liability, of contributions and taxes owed in
relation to work or services supplied pursuant to contracting
... arrangements in Italy.2 25

The second primary piece of legislation imposing joint liability on
Italian contracting chains is Law No. 248/2006 ("Law 248").226 Law 248
extended Law 276's joint and several liability to the fulfillment of withholding
tax obligations.227
Finally, Law No. 296/2006 ("Law 296") imposed liability on
contracting chains unique in Europe. "[T]he client or contractor is also
considered jointly and severally liable for injuries to the employees of a
contractor or any subcontractor(s) not compensated by the National Insurance
Institute for Industrial Accidents."228
The efficacy of Italy's liability laws is about the same as in France.
229
The Italian business community views these laws as unduly burdensome.
Furthermore, the business community balks at the almost unlimited liability that
230
the laws place upon clients and principal contractors.
On the other hand,
223
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trade unions strongly approve of the regulations, but also note that the laws fail
to address the core problems in Italy's markets. 23 1 The regulations impose such
liability on Italian clients and principal contractors that almost all pay and social
232
security contribution disputes are settled out of court.
Furthermore, the most
vulnerable workers are self-employed workers, which constitute 47% of Italy's
construction labour force. 233 Unfortunately, Italy's strict regulations are of little
avail to this work force. Overall, according to the trade unions, "no significant
improvement has been made over the last few years in the protection of workers
involved in contracting and subcontracting chains." 2 34
H. THE NETHERLANDS
Joint liability laws in the Netherlands date back to the 1960s, and were
a response to numerous instances of principal contractors in the construction
sector that were deliberately avoiding their social security obligations.235 The
Coordinatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen (Social Security Coordination Act or
"CSV") made user companies of temporary laborers jointly and severally liable
for unpaid social security taxes.236 However, since the CSV proved easy to
evade, the Dutch parliament passed the Wet Ketenaansprakelifskheid(Liability
of Subcontractors Act or "WKA") as part of the Wages and Salaries Tax and
Social Contributions Act of 1982.237 The WKA applies joint and several
liability for social security contributions and wage taxes to user companies or
principal contractors. 238 "[S]pecifically, the liability relates to wage tax,
national insurance contributions, the income-related contribution towards the
healthcare insurance scheme and employee insurance contributions from the
wages of the employees concerned." 239 The liability is joint and several, and
applicable to the whole chain of subcontractors or temporary work agencies, at
the same project or building site, for the social security and wages taxes due. 240
Id. at 16.
id.
233 id
234 Id. at
17.
235 Mijke Houwerzijl & Saskia Peters, Liability in Subcontracting Processes
in the European
ConstructionSector: Netherlands, in EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING
AND WORKING CONDITIONS, 2, (2008), available at
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/94/en/l/EFO894EN.pdf
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In theory, the liability could apply to every contractor in the chain, but only if
the subcontractor that failed to meet its obligations is insolvent. 241 The
principal justifications for the WKA were not only to better ensure that social
security contributions were paid, but also to defeat the unfair competitive
advantage that non-paying companies enjoyed over the compliant companies. 242
The chain liability rules may partly apply to (sub)contractors
and temporary work agencies established in another Member
State providing services in the Netherlands. However, the
rules will only apply when Dutch tax law or social security
law applies to the Dutch employees involved ... Furthermore,
the Dutch chain liability rules may be applicable when the
work is carried out abroad by Dutch subcontractors.243
If they so choose, clients or principal contractors that want to
indemnify themselves against liability under the WKA can establish a so-called
"G-account." 244 "[A G-account] is a blocked bank account in the agency's or
subcontractor's name . . . This account may only be used for paying social

security contributions and wage taxes to the Inland Revenue."245 Principal
contractors deposit amounts owed by their subcontractors for applicable taxes
directly into the G-account, with the remainder going to the subcontractor(s).246
By utilizing G-accounts, the potentially liable principal contractor can take
positive actions to ensure that their subcontractor(s) has actually withheld the
appropriate sums of money to be paid to their Inland Revenue, and thus, avoid
liability.
Like in the other Member States, the Netherlands has a collective
Arbeidsovereenkomst de Bouwnejverheid (Collective Labour Agreement or
"CLA") that provides some measure of oversight by the principal contractor. 247
The CLA states, "[t]he employer is obliged to monitor the compliance of this
collective bargaining agreement in all individual employment contracts covered
by the agreement. When dealing with independent entrepreneurs, the employer
should agree on this in the subcontracting arrangement." 248 The CLA is
generally applicable in the Netherlands, and requires principal contractors to
241
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employ subcontractors or temporary work agencies on the condition that they
comply with applicable Dutch wage tax and social security laws. 24 9 However,
CLA enforcement mechanisms are somewhat nebulous. 25 0 Furthermore, the
CLA is not applicable to every trade, even within the Dutch construction
industry. 25 1 Though recent Dutch case law suggests that employees may be able
to bring suit against their employers for unpaid wages under the CLA,
widespread enforcement of CLA provisions remains unclear.252
Other laws on joint liability in the Netherlands are found in the
Burgerlfk Wetboek (Civil Code or "BW") and in the Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen
(Foreign Nationals Employment Act or "WAV"). 253 Articles 6 and 7 of the BW
provide for joint liability "in the event of industrial accidents or work-related
illnesses." 25 4 The aggrieved employee might be able to bring suit directly
against either his or her employer or the principal contractor, provided that he or
she can prove that either company failed to meet its duty of care. 55
Furthermore, under the WAV, joint liability exists between clients, principal
contractors and subcontractors, where the subcontractor employs a foreign
national without a work permit.256
According to the Eurofound report on the Netherlands, most of the
business, social and governmental actors "are satisfied with the current liability
arrangement for social security contributions and wage tax at the national
level." 25 7 In particular, the Dutch government hailed the G-accounts' success as
a preventative measure and for virtually eliminating illegal sewing workshops in
the Netherlands. 258 The liability laws, including the G-accounts, remain
considerably less effective at regulating temporary work agencies. 25 9 Most
business, social and governmental actors consider the CLA to be feckless and
ineffective.260 Consequently, the most popular and effective measures in the
Netherlands are those applying joint liability, while allowing companies to
avoid it through the application of basic preventative measures like G-accounts.
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I. SPAIN
Although Spain's joint liability laws in its modem democratic era date
back to the 1980s, the first meaningful legislation was passed in the 1990s with
Law 31/1995 on the Prevention of OccupationalHazards ("Law 31/1995").261
Law 31/1995 aimed to improve work place health and safety by requiring the
principal contractor to monitor the subcontractor's compliance with health and
safety standards.262 Where the subcontractor fails to comply and the work is
within the principal contractor's own workplace and sphere of activities, the
principal contractor will be held jointly liable. 2 63
Spain also implemented Law 45/1996, on posting of workers in the
context of cross-borderprovision of services ("Law 45/1995") in 1995.2 Law
45/1995 states that Spanish labour laws regarding working hours, wages and the
prevention of occupational hazards apply to domestic Spanish companies in the
same way that it applies to foreign companies operating in Spain. 265
"Therefore, principal contractors and user companies established in Spain have
the same obligations toward posted workers as they do in relation to domestic
workers."266
Article 42 of the Workers' Statute ("Article 42") provides for joint
liability of the principal contractor for social wages and security contributions.
As in Law 31/1995, liability attaches where the subcontracted work is within the
principal contractor's so-called own activity.267 The liability extends throughout
the contract life, and ends a full year after the contract expires. 268
However, no legally established mechanism exists to enforce
the [social security and wage] obligations. The common
practice is for the principal contractor to carry out regular and
effective checks to ensure compliance with legal obligations
on the part of the subcontractors; for example, it may request

261
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copies of the relevant pay slips or bank transfer documents.269
Principal contractors can also request proof of met obligations directly
and monthly from their subcontractors.270
In 2006, Spain passed Law 32/2006, on subcontracting in the
construction sector ("Law 32/2006"), which as the name implies, applies
exclusively to the Spanish construction sector. 27 1 "Article 4(2) of [Law
32/2006] refers to the obligation [of principal contractors] to ensure that
workers are adequately trained in the prevention of occupational hazards, as
well as the duty to have a preventative organization in place and to register with
the Register of Accredited Companies." 272
Noncompliance with these
requirements results in joint liability between the malfeasant subcontractor and
273
Interestingly, Article 5 of Law 32/2206 limits the
its principal contractor.
number of vertical links in the subcontracting chain to three, absent a special
showing that more subcontractors are objectively required to complete the
work.274 Article 5 evidences Spain's efforts to simplify the contracting process
by constricting the length of the vertical contracting chain.
In 2003, Spain passed Law 58/2003, a general tax law that holds
principal contractors liable for the tax debt of their subcontractors. 275 This
includes tax debt for "workers, professionals, or other entrepreneurs - for the
part corresponding to the subcontracted works or services; [including] any
amounts payable or to be withheld."276 The principal contractor can avoid this
liability if it obtains from the subcontractor clearance certificates declaring that
the subcontractor is compliant. 277
According to the Eurofound report on Spain, the Spanish labour and
business community is generally satisfied with the existing liability laws. 278 "In
general, the existing laws provide an effective and adequate regulatory
framework - although in practices disputes may arise about the interpretation of
concepts such as 'own activity' and the 'workplace of the entrepreneur,' or
about the scope of various obligations subsumed under joint liability." 27 9 The
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vagueness of key terms in the various liability laws has obstructed enforcement
efforts by the Spanish government.280 However, nothing in the report indicates
that Spain would oppose stricter liability regulations, so long as they are more
clearly worded.
III. REACTIONS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL AND BUSINESS ACTORS
TO JOINT LIABILITY PROPOSALS
The reactions to proposals for joint liability in European subcontracting
fall along predictable lines among the various social actors generally favoring
more stringent regulations and the business actors generally not favoring them.
Social actors include labour organizations, non-governmental organizations and
governments. Business actors include MNEs, national businesses, trade groups
and non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, the E.U. neither solicited
nor published opinions on the Motion. Consequently, a dearth of information
about this Motion exists from social and business actors since its adoption as a
non-legislative resolution in March of 2009.
Consequently, the most
comprehensive materials available concerning European attitudes toward joint
liability laws date back to the 2007, Outcome of the Public Consultation on the
Commission's Green Paper "Modernisinglabour law to meet the challenges of
the 21s' century ("Green Paper"), mentioned above in the discussion on the
Motion's recitals. Fortunately, the questions posed in the Green Paper
concerning joint liability regulations are sufficiently similar to the proposals in
the Motion so that an adequate comparison can be made. Question number 9 in
the Green Paper asks, in part: "Would subsidiary liability be an effective and
feasible way to establish that responsibility in the case of sub-contractors? If
not, do you see other ways to ensure adequate protection of workers in 'threeway relationships'?" 281 The responsive communication from the European
Commission to the Council and Parliament generally stated that Member States
were split about the need for subsidiarity (joint) liability "to ensure compliance
with employment rights through the EU." 282 Social actors like the European
Trade Union Confederation ("ETUC") "considered that a Community initiative
is required in the form of an instrument to regulate the 'chain responsibility' of
user enterprises and intermediaries in the case of agency work and sub-

280
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281

266

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol9/iss1/10

36

Amon: Liability Regulations in European Subcontracting: Will Joint Liab
LIABILITY REGULATIONS INEUROPEAN SUBCONTRACTING
contracting." 283 Business actors generally argued that joint liability laws were
ineffective, and that subcontractors were already sufficiently regulated by
national legislation.284
Social actors, like the ETUC, argued very strongly for a Communitywide instrument adopting joint liability as a European response to
subcontracting abuses.
[I]n recent times we have argued in favour of a European
instrument regulating joint and several liability (or 'chainresponsibility') of user enterprise and intermediary in case of
agency work and subcontracting, not only for the payment of
taxes and social security contributions, but also for wages...
The European Commission should encourage Member States
that have not yet done so to take initiatives to introduce so
called systems of 'client liability,' 'chain responsibility' or
'joint and several liability,' bring together the various
practices in member States, and consider the proposal of a
Community initiative on this matter.285
Other social actors like the European Federation of Building and
Woodworkers ("EFBWW") argued that principal contractors have superior
financial resources and bargaining power, which they often use to negotiate
less-than-fair deals with questionable subcontracting companies.286
Furthermore, a lack of clear and consistent rules exists across the European
Community, holding subcontracting chains responsible for failure to pay taxes
and wages.287 Consequently:
The EFBWW considers that the adoption of a European
directive on ultimate liability of general contractors
and/clients is indispensable with a view to ensuring
compliance with and application of provisions governing pay
and working conditions, social security and tax liabilities in a
283
284
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subcontracting chain. Such a directive would close the legal
loophole whereby subcontracting is used to get around tax,
social, statutory and contractual obligations, thereby distorting
the market and removing protection for workers.288
Alternately, European business actors generally argued that Europeanwide joint liability regulations would prove ineffective, or that national
sufficiently. 289
subcontracting
regulating
was
already
legislation
EuroCommerce noted in its position paper that principal contractors or
companies that utilize temporary work agencies cannot effectively monitor their
subcontractors' or temporary workers' hours, and that such legislation should be
left to the Member States. 290 Likewise, the Confederation of British Industry
noted: "UK employers are clear that the agency worker's primary relationship is
with the agency. User companies do not get involved in the details of an agency
worker's terms and conditions and it would not be acceptable for employment
responsibilities to be passed to the user company." 2 9 1
Furthermore,
"[c]ompanies using sub-contractors should be able to rely on the fact that those
sub-contractors have to fulfill their labour law responsibilities - ensuring their
subcontractors comply with the law is not their responsibility (emphasis
added)."292 The Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering and
Technology-Based Industries bluntly stated:
It is simply not realistic to make main contractors responsible
for the activities of their sub-contractors in the production
chain. It would furthermore be neither efficient nor desirable
to set up this subsidiary liability for sub-contractors. It would
paralyze the economy and have a negative impact because of
the incalculable risks for which companies could be liable
(emphasis added).293
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Even the European Commission, in its June 2009 response to the
Motion, urged caution with regards to a Community-wide legal instrument for
joint liability. "The Commission believes that a cautious approach is required.
Account needs to be taken of the variety of legal systems in place in the
Member States as well as the contrasting views among stakeholders as to the
feasibility and/or desirability of a Community legal instrument. 294 In its
response, the Commission cited the public consultation to the Green Paper as
evidence that the E.U. needs more time to analyze the principal of joint liability
as an effective means of protecting workers' rights in subcontracting chains.295
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that the Motion will make much headway in the
European Union. That is, the principal of joint liability as a European principal
is unlikely to become a binding Directive on the Member States. The Motion's
implications are too broad, and the potential opposition to the concept of joint
and several liability without a scienter requirement is too strong. The principal
reasons why the Motion's principles will not likely become a Directive are:
1. The Motion is overly broad.
2.

The Motion has adamant detractors.

3.

Joint Liability Legislation has not proven itself effective
at fighting fraud.

4.

Joint liability legislation has not proven itself effective at
protecting vulnerable workers.

The Motion is overly broad. Though one could interpret the legislation
as being applicable solely to the European construction sector, that is not
explicitly stated in the Motion. Consequently, it is unclear whether the
Committee intended for joint liability to be a European rule in all sectors of the

Follow-up to the European Parliament Resolution on the Social Responsibility of Subcontracting
Undertakings in Production Chains, Adopted by the Commission on 17 June 2009, EuR. PARL. Doc.
A6-0065/2009, at 2 (2009).
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economy or just in the constructions sectors, where the eight Member States that
currently have joint liability legislation have limited its scope. Given that only
eight out of the total membership of twenty-seven states have liability rules that
are not uniform, and are applicable mostly to the construction sector, it seems
unlikely that the European Union would readily accept a sweeping endorsement
of joint liability regulations for all sectors of the economy. However, if the
legislation would be tailored to the construction or building sector exclusively,
the situation may be different.
Furthermore, the Motion has adamant detractors. Consistently, in each
of the eight Member State reports, fierce opposition from the business
community has prevented the enactment of more stringent liability regulations.
The reasons for opposing this legislation are simple: the existing regulations are
complicated, expensive to implement, lack a scienter requirement, and expose
the client and principal contractor to potentially unlimited liability. Until these
concerns are addressed through dialogue between the European Union and the
European business community, with the goal of finding the best business
practices that address both parties' concerns, the European business community
will not likely be persuaded by the Motion's principles.
Joint liability legislation itself has not been proven effective at fighting
fraud. The Eurofound reports consistently reported relatively few cases where
the liability legislation actually combated fraudulent contracting practices. The
reports cites various reasons for this lack of efficacy, including a general
cultural acceptance of black market labour, lack of practical access to the host
country's legal system, a general unwillingness on the part of worker's to bring
suit to recover wages, and a lack of government involvement in the supervision
and enforcement of the liability provisions. Given the relatively weak track
record of even the strongest liability laws, it seems unlikely that the European
Union would adopt a far-reaching liability regime.
Furthermore, joint and several liability legislation itself has not been
proven effective at protecting vulnerable workers. Strong practical barriers
exist between aggrieved workers and judicial redress. For example, host
country's labour unions often do not represent posted workers. Posted workers
often work illegally and thus have no legal remedy, posted workers often do not
speak the host country's language, posted workers are often ignorant of the
judicial remedies available to them, posted workers often fear losing their job or
obtaining future employment, posted workers often accept lower-than-minimum
wages because they are still higher than their home country's wages, posted
workers are often pushed into settling out of court by their employer, and posted
workers are reluctant to take advantage of the liability legislation because
judicial remedies can take too long.
Moreover, in the construction industry alone, a large percentage of
270
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workers are self-employed and are not working for a subcontractor in the
traditional sense. Though the Motion addresses some of these concerns, the
Eurofound reports demonstrate that liability legislation has thus far failed to
address the specific needs of these aggrieved workers.
Although it seems unlikely that the Motion will ever be adopted as a
Directive as it is currently drafted, the record shows that many E.U. Member
States are at least open to the imposition of joint liability restrictions on
businesses as a solution to the increasingly complex web of multinational
business activities. Given this openness to at least the principle, it seems likely
that the E.U. could pass legislation pushing for joint liability laws in a specific
industrial sector, such as construction. Thus, by focusing on a specific
industrial sector and adopting the best practices that were outlined in the
Motion's recitals and the Eurofound reports, the principal of joint liability may
indeed become the European means of regulating MNEs in the 2 1st Century.
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